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DEMOCRATIC EROSION AND THE COURTS:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
AZIZ Z. HUQ*
Can national judiciaries play a role in resisting democratic backsliding? This essay
explores the role of courts in the context of democratic erosion by examining case
studies from South Africa and Colombia that showcase positive models of judicial
intervention. Such positive results are not pervasive—Hungary’s and Poland’s
experiences, for example, cut in the other direction. But by examining the institutional
and political conditions under which national judiciaries have impeded, if not
prevented, backsliding, it is possible to gain some insight into how courts can play a
role in supporting democratic practice.
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INTRODUCTION

Since late 2016, scholars and public intellectuals have expressed
increasing worry about a perceived fraying of democratic institutions in the
United States and beyond.1 In an article and forthcoming book concurring
in that assessment, Tom Ginsburg and I catalog a global deterioration of a
distinctive kind of liberal, democratic constitutionalism that since the 1990s
seemed hegemonic.2 Democracies today, we suggest, rarely end in a crisp
caesura. More common is a slow molting of democratic accouterments.3
Incremental declines in the quality of democratic competition, liberal rights
to election-related speech and association, and the administrative rule of
law add up over time to yield a less democratic, more authoritarian, polity.4
Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Venezuela, Bolivia, India, and Russia serve as
 Copyright © 2018 by Aziz Huq, Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law,
University of Chicago Law School. Support for this article was generously supplied by the Frank
J. Cicero, Jr. Fund.
1 See Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 78, 80, 163–64 (2018) (discussing concerns over democratic backsliding under President
Trump).
2 Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 1; TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ HUQ, HOW TO SAVE YOUR
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (forthcoming September 2018) (on file with author).
3 GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 2 (manuscript at 66).
4 Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 123–43.
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key examples.5 Understanding such democratic erosion requires a manypronged inquiry. Macroeconomic structure; the social determinants of
tolerant political cultures; the resilience of legal checks on elected
leaders—all of these matter when answering the question of what causes
democracies to decline. Legal scholars should be cognizant of the limits of
their expertise, aware that democratic erosion is associated with structural
changes in public psychology, geopolitics, and economic dynamics that law
can do little to reformulate.6 They should also be aware that while
diagnoses of democratic decline’s causes may be helpful, they cannot fully
answer the distinct and different question of whether law and institutional
design can help mitigate that risk in practice.
This Essay is focused on a narrow question of constitutional design
related to democratic erosion: What is the role of a national judiciary in the
defense against democratic erosion? Ginsburg and I have developed one
perspective on this question elsewhere, focusing on the federal judiciary’s
limited institutional incentive to defend democratic institutions.7 I won’t
repeat that analysis here. Instead, I draw on comparative experiences of
democratic erosion to explore how different elements of the judiciary’s
design—and in particular the constitutional election between what the
British legal theorist A.V. Dicey called “convention” rather than “law”8—
influences the rate of democratic decline. This question, I should stress at
the outset, stands independent of the question of whether courts can
vindicate individual rights imperiled by such erosion.9 I am concerned with
a system-level quality (democracy) not the rate of individual rights
violations.
I
COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

Comparative study of democratic backsliding reveals the complexity
of potential interactions between courts and partisan formations pressing an
antidemocratic agenda. These interactions, critically, are not instantaneous:
They unfold over time as sequential, strategic games (in the game5 See id. (referencing democratic regressions in these, and other, countries). The article and
book use the terms “retrogression” and “erosion” interchangeably. See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra
note 2; Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 1.
6 Cf. Paul Howe, Eroding Norms and Democratic Deconsolidation, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct.
2017, at 15, 23 (identifying a link between a broader set of “self-interested and antisocial
attitudes” and “indifferent feelings toward democracy”).
7 Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 1 (manuscript at 59–60).
8 A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 277–78
(Macmillan ed. 1915).
9 See Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 1 (manuscript at 31) (discussing instances in which
constitutional design promotes democratic stability at the cost of individual rights, and suggesting
that these ends can sometimes be in tension).
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theoretical sense). The terms of institutional conflict, moreover, are
dynamic. Neither the powers of the judiciary nor the instruments of
concurrent partisan control of the bench remain constant over time. In
consequence, the equilibrium outcomes of interbranch battles over
democratic norms are endogenous to initial entitlements of formal legal
entitlements, options to modify those entitlements, and the iterative,
strategic choices by judges and elected leaders about how formal and
informal (persuasive) powers are employed. Stated less formally, the rules
of the game determine in large measure the results of the game—in
particular when one of the prizes in the game is the ability to change those
rules on the fly. Both the game, and the rules of the game, as a result, are in
constant flux.
Some examples of judicial success and failure may help render this
less opaque. I rely here on examples because there are only a limited
number of democratic erosions, and econometric analysis is unhelpful.10
Consider first instances in which apex courts have resisted democratic
erosion. In a pair of decisions in 2005 and 2010, the Colombian
Constitutional Court first allowed President Álvaro Uribe Vélez to set aside
a one-term limit, but then barred him from abrogating a new two-term limit
through constitutional amendment.11 In the latter decision, the court
reasoned that a second extension of the presidential term would effectively
be a “substitution” of the constitution since it would allow the President to
“name members of the central bank, the attorney general, the ombudsman,
the chief prosecutor, and many members of the Constitutional Court.”12
This second decision is thought to have “prevent[ed] a significant erosion
of democracy by preventing a strong president from holding onto power
indefinitely.”13 In effect, the decision enabled other oversight institutions to
operate effectively in ways that helped promote democratic practices.14 The
decision, however, was only possible because the court had initially
avoided a confrontation with Uribe, and instead had delayed intervention
until it would have maximum effect and might generate more public
support.
A second example of successful judicial resistance to backsliding
comes from South Africa, where the hegemonic African National Congress

10 See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 2 (manuscript at 143–68) (presenting existing findings
of correlations between constitutional design decisions and rates of democratic decline).
11 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & Samuel Issacharoff, Living to Fight Another Day: Judicial
Deferral in Defense of Democracy, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 683, 717–19.
12 Id. at 718.
13 David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 203 (2013).
14 David Landau, A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1501, 1524 (2014)
(“[T]he Court at times has sought to prop up other control institutions in order to make them more
effective at their tasks of checking the executive.”).
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(ANC) has slipped into endemic self-dealing, undermining democratic
competition in favor of a spoils system.15 In its March 2016 Nkandla
judgment,16 the Constitutional Court ordered President Jacob Zuma to
repay millions of rand used to refurbish a private residence.17 The decision
was said to “de-legitimiz[e]” the president as a leader who relied on the
spoils system.18 As former Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke later
explained, it was “a wonderful moment to lecture each other about . . . the
kind of Commander-in-Chief that we hoped for.”19 In a forthcoming book
chapter, Ros Dixon and Theunis Roux contend that the Nkandla judgment
was a surgical judicial attack on a systemic threat to democracy—
insufficient to stem that threat completely, but enough to show the court’s
continued, albeit incremental, efficacy as a democratic safeguard.20 Dixon
and Roux underscore the long-term nature of the conflict between the ANC
and the court, and praise the latter for its strategic foresight in choosing a
narrow issue on which it could prevail with positive effects for the
democratic role of law.21 Whether that sort of surgical strike proves
commensurate to the threat of democratic backsliding in South Africa,
however, is a separate and far more troublesome question.
Finally, let me offer one rather more ambiguous example. Samuel
Issacharoff has argued that judiciaries can respond to the threat to
democracy posed by the rise of anti-system movements. In postwar France
and Germany, he notes, “independent judicial review” of party bans
constrained the misuse of associational regulations meant to protect the
public sphere, thereby legitimating prophylactic instruments of militant

15 See Alexander Beresford, Power, Patronage, and Gatekeeper Politics in South Africa, 114
AFR. AFF. 226, 226–27 (2015) (“Political leaders are said to derive support and legitimacy by
distributing patronage.”).
16 Economic Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic
Alliance v. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC) (S. Afr.).
17 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Africa’s Leadership Conundrum, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.,
Summer 2017, at 171, 187 & 191 n.17 (discussing impact of the scandal); Jessica Elgot, Jacob
Zuma Breached Constitution over Home Upgrades, South African Court Rules, GUARDIAN (Mar.
31, 2016, 7:14 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/31/jacob-zuma-orderedrepay-upgrades-nkandla-home-south-african-state-funds.
18 Moghalu, supra note 17, at 187.
19 Lizeka Tandwa, Nkandla Judgment Exemplary of ConCourt—Moseneke, NEWS24 (Jan.
28, 2017, 11:01PM), https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/nkandla-judgment-exemplaryof-concourt-moseneke-20170128.
20 Rosalind Dixon & Theunis Roux, Marking Constitutional Transitions: The Law and
Politics of Constitutional Implementation in South Africa, in FROM PARCHMENT TO PRACTICE:
CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING NEW CONSTITUTIONS (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Huq eds.,
forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 7–9) (on file with authors) (arguing that the court’s Nkandla
judgment showed that the court was prepared to criticize a senior national leader and partner with
other institutions to support constitutional democracy).
21 Id.
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democracy.22 I am more skeptical than Issacharoff, however, of these tools.
In practice, they have been employed against politically marginalized
immigrant and religious groups that have no chance of capturing state
power and used in ways that have no tangible positive impact on the
performance of democracy. In particular, the use of militant democratic
tools against Muslim and Middle Eastern minorities in Europe—minorities
who are not poised to gain political or demographic majorities in the near
or even medium-term future—has been a way to close off political space
for especially vulnerable sectors of society who are subject to a good deal
of discrimination.23 To the contrary, the recent exemplars of European
militant democracy strike me as clear examples of anti-democratic
practices aimed at eliminating minority groups’ voices from political
debates.
Clearly on the other side of the ledger are a series of counterexamples
in which national judiciaries have failed to prevent backsliding. Such
failures, as much as successes, help us understand when and why courts
resist democratic erosion, and it would be a serious mistake to look at
successes without also accounting for failures.24 The latter suggest in
particular that where a political coalition anticipates judicial resistance, it
can try ex ante to disarm judges via constitutional change, statutory reform,
constitutional change, or sheer bullying. Where courts are caught off guard
by such aggressive initiatives, they are unlikely to impose much by way of
friction on democratic backsliding.
Thus, in Hungary the Fidesz party in 2013 took advantage of an
unexpected legislative supermajority to alter the constitution so as to
abrogate prior judicial precedent en masse and limit judicial review to
procedural (as distinct from substantive) questions of legality and
constitutionality.25 Its most important consequential change, however,
concerned the confirmation process: A system by which a majority of
parliamentary parties had to endorse a candidate for the Supreme Court was

22

Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1453–56 (2007).
See Aziz Huq, The Uses of Religious Identity, Practice, and Dogma in ‘Soft’ and ‘Hard’
Counterterrorism, in SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Liora Lazarus & Benjamin Goold eds.,
forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6–10) (describing U.S. and European immigration and
profiling regulations that have targeted Islam). On the presence of discrimination against Muslims
in Europe, see Aziz Z. Huq, What Is the Case Against Muslims?, in “THE EMPIRE OF DISGUST”:
PREJUDICE, STIGMA, AND DISCRIMINATION IN INDIA AND THE U.S. (Martha Nussbaum et al.
eds.) (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2–6) (on file with author).
24 See Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq & Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of Liberal
Constitutionalism?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 15) (discussing how
scholars’ case-selections have affected the outcome of studies of democratic erosion).
25 Keno Verseck, Hungary Steps Away from European Democracy, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar.
11, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/hungary-constitutional-reformssignal-drift-away-from-democracy-a-888064.html.
23
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abandoned in favor of one in which Fidesz has plenary control of who sits
on the court.26
This dynamic can take a statutory as well as a constitutional form
where a political coalition has sufficient majorities. In Poland, for example,
after the populist Law and Justice Party (PiS) won a plurality of seats in
October 2015 legislative elections, it refused to seat the Constitutional
Tribunal Justices who had been selected by other parties but awaited
commissions; amended the statutory framework for judicial appointments
to centralize control in the PiS-controlled Sejm, the lower house of the
Polish Parliament, changed the voting rule in constitutional cases to make
invalidations less frequent, and rejiggered the flow of cases to the court.27
Further centralization of appointments powers was derailed by an
unexpected demurrer by the PiS-aligned president—a response, perhaps, to
popular and international pressure.28 In December 2017, however, a new
slate of judicial reforms were passed by the Sejm that, in the words of the
Council of Europe, once again “put[] at serious risk the independence of all
parts of the Polish judiciary.”29 A third possibility is that courts will fail to
resist democratic erosion even without de jure change. In Venezuela, the
government of Hugo Chávez relied first on its appointments power.30 When
judges continued to resist his agenda, Chávez leveraged street protests
against the court and “strong rhetoric” in public speeches to undermine the
judiciary.31 In Turkey, in a variant on this dynamic, the Constitutional
Court in 2008 permitted criminal indictments against the ruling Justice and
Development (AK) Party to proceed based on party leaders’ public
condemnations of a ban on religious garb in public universities.32 But less
than a decade later, a resurgent and popular AK Party was able to purge
and neuter the judiciary by rallying public opinion against it.33 (Note here
26 Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Illiberal Turn:
Disabling the Constitution, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2012, at 138, 139.
27 Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 1 (manuscript at 42–43).
28 See Rick Lyman, Poland’s President Vetoes 2 Proposed Laws Limiting Courts’
Independence,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
24,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/world/europe/poland-president-duda-veto-courts.html.
29 Christian Davies, Polish MPs Pass Judicial Bills amid Accusations of Threat to
Democracy,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
8,
2017,
9:58
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/08/polish-mps-pass-supreme-court-bill-criticisedas-grave-threat.
30 See Matthew M. Taylor, The Limits of Judicial Independence: A Model with Illustration
from Venezuela Under Chávez, 46 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 229, 251 (2014).
31 Id. at 251–53.
32 Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] Oct. 24, 2008, Esas No. 2008/1 (SPK), Karar
No.
2008/2
(Resmi
Gazete,
No.
27034)
(Turk.),
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/10/20081024-10.htm.
33 See Turkey’s Purges Are Crippling Its Justice System, ECONOMIST (May 20, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21722200-president-erdogans-drive-power-includesputting-judges-under-his-thumb-turkeys-purges-are (discussing the AK Party’s use of failed
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the contrast to Colombia: Moving too sharply too soon, the Constitutional
Court failed to check the AK Party’s antidemocratic impulses and exposed
itself to undermining countermoves.) These cases suggest that whatever
reservoir of diffuse support a constitutional court has,34 elected actors
typically have access to a wider range of media to shape and mobilize
public opinion. Their narrower public-facing toolkit—and the demand for
formality that is nominally the courts’ strong suit—ultimately leaves
judiciaries more vulnerable.
Comparative experience, to summarize this whistle-stop tour of global
examples, yields no easy or comforting instruction as to courts’ role at
moments of democratic erosion. More modestly, we might observe that a
common feature of these case studies is that they unfold over time.35 Courts
and elected actors alike engage in repeated interactions with evolving
hands of cards. Their tactical options vary as formal rules, electoral
alignments, and tacit understandings change. The nature of such conflict
will hinge first on the extent to which judges’ preferences are already
correlated with those of elected officeholders. Its end result will likely be a
function of complex interactions between institutional and political forces.
At best, as in the Colombian and South African cases, courts delay
backsliding. At worst, they are captured or eviscerated in backsliding’s
opening gambit. All this suggests a judiciary committed to democracy
should mimic La Fontaine’s reed rather than his oak,36 carefully playing a
moderating function at pivotal moments in the course of democratic
backsliding, in the hope, perhaps, that exogenous political developments
enable rather than erode the presuppositions of democracy’s continued
operation.
II
BRINGING BACKSLIDING HOME

What does this comparative experience entail for the American
context? Drawing lessons from comparative analysis is always difficult.
The small number of cases here and their internal heterogeneity are limiting
factors. With appropriate caution, though, we might draw two broad
implications.
coup).
34 For the distinction between specific and diffuse support, see Gregory A. Caldeira & James
L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 637
(1992).
35 Cf. Dixon & Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 685, 688 (discussing judicial deferral—or
constitutional decisions that do not have immediate effect—and celebrating the various strategies
of judicial deferral in defense of democracy).
36 JEAN DE LA FONTAINE, The Oak and the Reed, in THE COMPLETE FABLES 25, 25–26
(Norman R. Shapiro trans., 2007).
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To begin with, experience in Hungary, Poland, Venezuela, and Turkey
suggests that methods of judicial appointment are critical: Absent the
appointment of judges willing to resist democratic erosion, the judiciary
will not help sustain continued democratic competition. So it is telling that
the Columbian Constitutional Court is “relatively difficult to ‘pack’”
because a plurality of institutions are involved in appointments, which last
only eight years.37 As illuminating in my view is the fact that Fidesz’s first
strike against judicial autonomy from political control focused on the
appointment mechanism. Rather strikingly, I think it is profitable to see
Fidesz as choosing an appointment mechanism that is functionally
indistinguishable from the U.S. Constitution’s process during periods of
unified government as a tool for exercising hegemonic control over the
courts. Contrary the prevailing nostrums of judicial independence, the U.S.
has what is inevitably a politically framed judiciary.
The appointment mechanism of Article II, section 2, does not merely
concentrate authority in elected, nonprofessional hands. It is also silent as
to whether federal judges must be lawyers,38 let alone be predisposed to
rule-of-law values or the protection of democracy-related rights. The
considerable predictive power of the attitudinal model of judicial behavior39
suggests that judicial appointments approach a partisan spoils system. So
while lifetime tenure creates a lag in judicial appointments in the U.S.
context, a sufficient number of vacancies means that a political coalition
disdainful of democracy can minimize the risk of judicial impediment by
relying on Article II.40
Even if a tribunal is inclined to resist erosive developments, it cannot
do so absent formal and informal resources. Hence, the Colombian high
court is by formal design “one of the most powerful courts in the world,”
able (among other things) to “step[] in and perform[] core legislative
functions” as a way of checking the executive.41 It has also successfully
cultivated a reputation as a legitimate and robust protector of rights.42
37 David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law,
51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319, 339–40 (2010).
38 Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569, 1570 (2007).
39 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993) (putting forward the attitudinal model—that Supreme Court
Justices reach their decisions based on “ideological attitudes and values”—to explain the Court’s
decisions).
40 With only a little squinting, one can see something analogous happening in the United
States. See Charlie Savage, Trump Is Rapidly Reshaping the Judiciary. Here’s How., N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/politics/trump-judiciary-appealscourts-conservatives.html (discussing the Trump administration’s efforts to quickly confirm
young, conservative judges to federal appeals courts).
41 Landau, supra note 37, at 343.
42 See id. at 328 (noting the Colombian Court’s “extraordinarily high institutional
popularity”).
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While the South African high court does not enjoy the same popular
support,43 specific judges maintain strong reputations and support within
the ANC,44 and much of its jurisprudence coheres with the latter’s agenda,45
arguably vesting it with a measure of discretion.
The U.S. Supreme Court maintains a tolerably large reservoir of
public support, but lacks the formal protections of the Colombian Court. To
the contrary, I think it is profitable to understand that the federal judiciary’s
autonomy from concurrent partisan control is largely a matter of what the
British constitutional theorist A.V. Dicey called convention rather than law.
Diceyan conventions comprise a class of “customs, practices, maxims, or
precepts” that compose “the constitutional morality of modern England.”46
In Britain, they are distinctly oriented by the goal of “determining the mode
in which the discretionary powers of the Crown . . . ought to be
exercised.”47 In the “long run,” conventions ensure that Parliament and the
cabinet honor “the true political sovereign of the State—the majority of the
electors or . . . the nation.”48
Conventions of judicial autonomy from political control matter
because textual and precedential protections of courts’ autonomy are
exiguous.49 For instance, Article III allocates a “judicial power,” but does
not define it.50 Precedential delineation of the term largely hinges on a
rather obscure, and not obviously consequential, distinction between public
and private rights.51 The Constitution is also notoriously silent in respect to
the extent of legislative authority to control or restrict lower-court or
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. Marshall Court precedent upholds
radical excision of entire limbs of the judiciary.52 More recent precedent
even allows extensive ex ante control by specific case outcomes.53 Finally,
43 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy, Popular
Acceptance, and the South African Constitutional Court, 65 J. POL. 1, 3 (2003).
44 See Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Design Two Ways: Constitutional Drafters as Judges,
57 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 32–33 (2017) (discussing trust existing between the ANC and original
members of the Constitutional Court of South Africa).
45 See Theunis Roux, Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa,
7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 106, 138 (2009) (discussing “mutually beneficial relationship” between the
ANC and the constitutional court).
46 DICEY, supra note 8, at 277–78.
47 Id. at 280–81.
48 Id. at 285.
49 For a historical treatment of the same point, see Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and
Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465 (2018).
50 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
51 See Anthony J. Casey & Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1155, 1190–95 (2015) (discussing how the public right/private right distinction has been
used to define the bounds of bankruptcy courts’ authority as non-Article III courts).
52 See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803) (holding Congress can make outcome
determinative changes to laws affecting pending cases).
53 See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (upholding against separation of
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the text assures judges of maintenance in office “during good Behaviour”
with undiminished compensation (albeit unsheltered from inflation),54 but
does not say in what court, or with what jurisdiction.
Rather than its weak textual carapace, Diceyan conventions shelter the
federal judiciary from concurrent political influence. Hence, whereas text
and historical practice can be read to allow for fairly expeditious removal
of federal judges,55 there is a convention that impeachment is the sole
appropriate removal mechanism. This promotes judicial insulation from
political control as much as the “good behavior” language of the
Constitution. Or consider the resolving power of judicial orders. Nothing in
the Constitution speaks to their scope or obligating force. There are
colorable arguments to the effect that some final judgments do not even
have a dispositive force of law in respect to the federal government.56 Since
the 1980s, legal scholars documented the “pervasiveness of
nonacquiescence” with judicial orders by federal agencies.57 More recent
scholarship has documented the frailty of judicial will to enforce final
judgments against recalcitrant federal officials, and emphasized judicial
reliance on convergent norms of legality and “shaming” effects.58 Even
where overt noncompliance is not observed, foot-dragging or countercampaigns against judicial opinions in the legislative and public sphere can
rob a judgment of much effectual power.59 The norm of official compliance
with specific injunctive directives is hence, in practice, quite tenuous.
The conventional nature of judicial autonomy means that the federal
courts are vulnerable to a wide array of lawful countermeasures designed to
limit their autonomy from concurrent political control. In an extended
interbranch conflict over democratic erosion, this means that judges have a
weak and limited hand to play—one unlikely to prevail against a
sufficiently determined political coalition.
powers challenges the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, which
identified assets available for execution in a particular District Court action, identified by docket
number).
54 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
55 See Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE
L.J. 72, 88–92 (2006) (discussing the historical meaning of “good behavior” as broader than its
current definition).
56 For a summary of scholars’ positions to this effect, see Jennifer Mason McAward,
Congress’s Power to Block Enforcement of Federal Court Orders, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1359,
1363–64 (2008).
57 Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 692 (1989).
58 See Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental
Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 697–98 (2018).
59 See Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 572–73 (2017)
(noting how “prestige concerns” contributed to many federal judges’ reluctance to issue
controversial rulings in Guantánamo habeas cases despite legal authority to do so).
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CONCLUSION

Democratic backsliding can involve prolonged abrasive contact
between the judiciary and the elected branches. In the United States
context, many of the claims that the federal bench can tender in selfdefense have more of a conventional than a legal character. Thus, they are
not likely to prove durable. For those interested in the defense of
democratic institutions against erosion, this result may have practical
implications. It suggests that trial balloons floated in the academy and the
public sphere imagining new limits on judicial autonomy are more
important than they might first seem: Such proposals can undermine
conventional understandings of such autonomy. This analysis might also
push toward more purposive and holistic forms of legal argument that resist
the decomposition of judicial autonomy into granules vulnerable to the first
political storm. Instead, infused by a Diceyan spirit, defenders of
democracy might recognize that the latter is a system-level quality that
rests not just about specific clauses or propositions of law: It is a matter of
supervening constitutional and conventional morality—a morality that must
be articulated, justified, and defended as a predicate to democracy’s
preservation.

